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1. Introduction 
The provision of non-audit services (NAS) by auditors to their clients received 
worldwide regulatory attention in the early 2000’s, following high-profile corporate 
collapses (e.g., Enron and WorldCom (US) and HIH Insurance (Australia)).  
Underpinning this regulatory reform is the belief that NAS reduces the quality of 
financial statements by impairing auditor independence.  As stated by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, “an auditor’s independence is impaired either 
when the accountant is not independent in fact, or when in light of all relevant facts 
and circumstances, a reasonable investor would conclude that the auditor would not 
be capable of acting without bias” (SEC 2000).  This comment highlights the two 
dimensions of auditor independence, “independence in fact” and “independence in 
appearance.”  Prior research examining the first dimension of auditor independence 
provides inconsistent results with the majority of studies finding that NAS does not 
impair auditor independence (e.g., DeFond, Raghunandan & Subramanyam 2002; 
Chung & Kallapur, 2003; Hay, Knechel & Li, 2006).  Increasingly, more attention is 
being devoted to the second dimension of auditor independence (e.g., Glezen & 
Millar, 1985, Krishnan, Sami & Zhang, 2005; Khurana & Raman, 2006). 
  
This paper examines whether the perception of auditor independence impacts on 
investors’ decisions.  The context used in this study is the premium offered by bidding 
firms in Australian hostile takeovers.  When a company decides to make a takeover 
offer, the calculation of the offer price is a crucial decision.  In a friendly takeover, the 
target firm can typically conduct a due diligence of the target firm’s financial affairs.  
For example, in the 2006 friendly takeover bid for Qantas Airways Limited by Airline 
Partners Australia, Qantas indicates in its Target Statement “the Board granted due 
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diligence and management access to the consortium investors after obtaining 
confidentiality undertakings.”1  In contrast, in a hostile takeover, as the bidding firm 
(and its advisers) do not have access to inside information about the target firm, the 
pricing decision must be based on publicly available financial information.  In these 
circumstances, it is expected that any doubt over target firm financial statement 
credibility will flow through to the premium offered.  As a result, this context 
provides an interesting research setting to determine if the provision of NAS affects 
the perception of auditor independence and, consequently, influences the premium 
offered by the acquiring firm.  Investigating this association in Australia is 
advantageous as fees received by auditors are a required disclosure.  Furthermore, as 
Australia is less litigious than the US, Australian auditors have less incentive to 
remain independent due to the lower concern that litigation will harm their reputation 
(Francis, 2006 and Gul, Tsui & Dhaliwal, 2006). 
 
The hypothesis of a positive relationship between takeover premiums and auditor 
independence is tested using audit and NAS fee data for the target firm collected for 
the year prior to the takeover announcement.  The results indicate there is no 
association between auditor independence and takeover premiums.  These findings 
add to prior research and raise doubts over whether the introduction of regulation to 
restrict the provision of NAS by auditors was justified. 
 
Findings from previous research indicate that large audit firms provide a higher 
quality audit (e.g., Palmrose, 1988 and Beatty, 1989)  This study extends this line of 
research by examining if target firms using Big 4 auditors receive a higher takeover 
                                                 
1 Qantas Airways Limited, Target Statement, p 13.  Available on the ASX website: 
http://www.asx.com.au. 
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premium in hostile bids.  In hostile bids the greater financial statement credibility 
offered by the use of a large auditor is predicted to result in the payment of a higher 
premium.  Furthermore, this study determines if the association between takeover 
premiums and auditor type was impacted by the auditing failures that occurred in the 
early 2000’s.  The results indicate that in hostile takeovers higher takeover premiums 
are paid to target firms engaging large auditors.  This additional premium however is 
eliminated in the period following the auditing scandals in the early 2000s.  This 
finding is consistent with a loss in reputation for the large auditing firms following the 
auditing failures. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 discusses prior 
literature and develops hypotheses.  The subsequent section discusses the research 
design and is followed by a description of the data collection process.  Section 5 
presents the results and the final section of the paper provides a conclusion. 
 
2. Prior literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 Auditor reputation and independence 
As auditor reputation is not directly observable, prior research uses auditor size and 
brand name as an indicator of auditor reputation and quality.  The use of size as a 
proxy for audit quality is advocated by DeAngelo (1981).  She argues that, as larger 
audit firms have a greater potential loss of client specific quasi-rents from breaching 
audit independence, they have a greater ability to perform their duties free of 
management’s influence.  Likewise, size will be a valid proxy for quality because 
large auditors have an incentive to protect their investment in brand name and 
reputation (Klein & Leffler, 1981 and Shapiro, 1983).  The findings of prior research 
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(e.g. Francis, 1984; Francis & Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1986; Francis & Simon, 1987; 
Gist, 1992; Pong & Whittington, 1994; Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995; Ashbaugh, 
LaFond & Mayhew, 2003 and Choi, Kim, Liu & Simunic, 2008) of an audit fee 
premium being paid to large auditors is typically interpreted as being consistent with 
such auditors providing a higher quality product.2 
 
Studies examining the outcomes of the audit process are also consistent with large 
auditors providing higher quality audits.  For example, prior studies indicate that large 
auditors have a lower incidence of litigation (Palmrose, 1988),3 have higher earnings 
quality (e.g., Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam, 1998; Krishnan, 2003 and 
Francis & Wang, 2008) and are associated with lower underpricing in initial public 
offerings (IPOs) (Balvers, McDonald & Miller, 1988 and Beatty, 1989).4  In addition, 
Menon and Williams (1991) find that the majority of auditor changes in an IPO are to 
a large auditor consistent with such auditors increasing financial statement credibility.  
Furthermore, Lee, Stokes, Taylor and Walter, (2003) show that firms in IPO’s using a 
large auditor are more likely to provide earnings forecasts. 
 
In the case that an auditor provides NAS to their audit clients, it is argued that cost 
savings arising from knowledge spillovers create an economic bond between the 
client and auditor (Simunic, 1984; Beck, Frecka & Solomon 1988).  It is contended 
that this economic dependence results in the auditor being more willing to 
                                                 
2 Not all studies document a Big 4 audit fee premium.  For instance, Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy 
and Zhou (2006) document otherwise. 
3 In contrast, Lys and Watts (1994) find the probability of litigation is not associated with auditor size. 
4 Chang, Gygax, Oon and Zhang (2008) find greater underpricing in Australian IPO’s when a large 
auditor is used.  They interpret this result as indicating that the use of a quality auditor signals a higher 
after-market value of the newly listed firm. 
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compromise their independence and acquiesce to the will of management.  This 
contention assumes that the costs of breaching independence (e.g., litigation and loss 
of reputation) are less than the benefits of client retention.  Additionally, it is claimed 
that, as NAS provides a greater financial return, auditors will not want to take actions 
that jeopardise this lucrative revenue stream.  For example, Arthur Levitt, the 
chairman of the US SEC, stated, “the audit function is simply being used as a 
springboard to more lucrative consulting services” (Levitt, 2000). 
 
Research however, has provided inconsistent evidence on whether auditors’ 
independence “in fact” is impaired by higher NAS.  For example, prior studies find no 
association between NAS and audit qualifications (Barkess & Simnett, 1994; 
Craswell, 1999; Craswell, Stokes & Laughton, 2002; DeFond, et al. 2002; Geiger & 
Rama, 2003; Hay, et al. 2006; Fargher & Jiang, 2008; Lim & Tan, 2008; Robinson, 
2008 and Callaghan, Parkash & Singhal, 2009) and NAS and audit tenure (DeBerg, 
Kaplan & Pany, 1991; Barkess et al. 1994 and Hay, et al. 2006).5  Other studies, 
however, provide conflicting evidence and show that higher NAS reduces the 
likelihood an auditor will provide a going concern opinion (Wines, 1994; Sharma, 
2001; Sharma & Sidhu, 2001 and Basioudis, Papakonstantinou & Geiger 2008). 
 
Similarly, mixed results have been achieved when investigating accrual quality.  A 
number of studies document that NAS increases discretionary accruals and reduces 
accrual quality (e.g., Frankel, Johnson & Nelson, 2002, Gul, Jaggi & Krishnan 2007, 
Srinidhi & Gul, 2007, Cahan, Emanuel, Hay & Wong, 2008).  Other studies however 
find either no association between discretionary accruals and NAS (Ashbaugh, et al. 
                                                 
5 Beck, Frecka and Solomon (1988) present inconsistent results and find auditor tenure is significantly 
greater where auditors provide ongoing NAS. 
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2003; Chung et al. 2003; Larcker & Richardson, 2004 and Reynolds, Deis & Francis, 
2004) or a negative association (Antle, et al. 2006).  Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz 
(2004) and Bloomfield and Shackman (2008) report a weak association between NAS 
and earnings restatements.  Ruddock, Taylor and Taylor (2006) show that NAS fees 
are unrelated to earnings conservatism. 
 
Recent research examining if NAS impairs auditors’ actual independence has moved 
to using fee data at the office level as opposed to the firm level.  For example, Li 
(2009) finds the association between NAS fees and an auditors’ propensity to issue a 
going concern opinion is insignificant pre-SOX and positive post-SOX.  Reynolds and 
Francis (2001) find more important clients at the local level have lower discretionary 
accruals and lower variance in discretionary accruals.  The results of both these 
studies are inconsistent with auditors compromising independence.  Contrasting 
results, however, are found in a UK study by Ferguson, Seow and Young (2004).   
 
The second aspect of auditor independence, “independence in appearance,” has 
received additional focus in recent research.  Inconsistent with NAS reducing the 
appearance of independence Glezen et al. (1985) find no association between auditor 
approval rates and the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees.  A negative association between 
a firm’s earnings response coefficient (ERC) and NAS fees is found in Krishnan, et al. 
(2005), Gul, et al. (2006) and Lim et al. (2008).  Francis et al. (2006) report that this 
association is driven by firms with high accruals whilst Lim et al. (2008) find the 
relationship is moderated when the auditee engages an industry specialist auditor.  In 
contrast, Ghosh, Kallapur and Moon (2009) show greater client importance arising 
from audit fees, but not non-audit fees, results in a significantly lower ERC. 
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Consistent with NAS impairing the perception of auditor independence, Khurana et 
al. (2006) and Dhaliwal, Gleason, Heitzman and Melendrez (2008) find that higher 
NAS fees increase respectively the cost of equity capital and the cost of debt.   
Studies assessing the impact of the collapse of Enron on other clients of Arthur 
Andersen have produced mixed findings.  Krishnamurthy, Zhou and Zhou (2006) find 
that amongst Andersen’s other audit clients those purchasing greater NAS 
experienced significantly higher negative abnormal returns around the indictment of 
Andersen in March 2002.  Chaney and Philipich (2002) however find that the amount 
of NAS purchased by Andersen’s other clients is unrelated to abnormal returns around 
the disclosure in January 2002 that Andersen had shredded a number of documents. 
 
Despite a lack of conclusive findings that NAS fees impinge on auditor independence, 
regulators worldwide have moved to provide greater controls over the provision of 
NAS by auditors and calls have been made to prohibit the provision of any NAS by a 
firm’s auditor (e.g., Francis, 2004).  For example, the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
legislated in 2002 prohibited the provision of certain types of services by auditors to 
their audit client (e.g., internal control).  In Australia, audit reforms were put in place 
in 2004 following CLERP Issue Paper 9 “Corporate Disclosure – Strengthening the 
Financial Reporting Framework.”  The reforms include requirements for auditor 
partner rotation and a restriction on auditors taking management positions with a 
former client.  The UK also modified auditor independence rules despite there being 
no high profile local company collapses arising from audit failures.  Fearnley and 
Beattie (2004) discuss these reforms. 
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2.2 Takeover premiums 
Research across many countries documents significant abnormal returns around 
takeover announcements (e.g., Bugeja; 2005a; Constantinou, Trigeorgis & Vafeas, 
2005 and Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz & Zutter, 2008).  Various explanations have 
been examined to explain the size of takeover premiums.  These include cost savings 
arising from synergies between the target and acquiring firm (e.g., Morck, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1990; Sudarsanam, Holl & Salami, 1996 and Hietala, Kaplan & Robinson, 
2003), and the disciplining of inefficient or underperforming target management (e.g., 
Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003 and Harford, 2003). 
 
The association between the quality and credibility of accounting information and 
takeover premiums, including the role of the target firm auditor, remains largely 
unexplored.  Raman, Shivakamur and Tamayo (2008) report a negative association 
between target firm earnings quality and takeover premiums in negotiated bids and an 
insignificant finding in non-negotiated bids.  Their explanation of the results is that 
information obtained in negotiations is likely to be more useful for targets with poor 
earnings quality than for those with high earnings quality.  Louis (2005) finds that 
bidding firms using a non-Big 4 auditor have higher takeover announcement returns.  
The finding is consistent with smaller auditors being able to provide superior takeover 
advice due to their more specialised knowledge of their local communities and clients. 
 
Bugeja (2005b) investigated independent expert valuation reports provided by 
Australian target firms.  The results indicated that the frequency with which the 
opinion provided by the expert agreed with the recommendation of the target firm 
board was indifferent between reports authored by the target firm auditor and other 
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experts.  The market reaction to the release of the expert report however was only 
significant if the expert report was produced by a firm other than the target firm 
auditor.  This finding indicates that the perception of auditor independence is 
important in establishing the credibility of information provided during a takeover. 
 
Anderson, Stokes and Zimmer (1993) and Firth (1999) examine the choice of auditor 
by the acquiring firm following a successful takeover in Australia and the UK 
respectively.  Both studies find that the vast majority of acquiring firms choose to 
switch auditors to their own incumbent.  Firth (1999) finds that the acquiring firm is 
more/(less) likely to change auditors when it engaged a large/(small) audit firm prior 
to the takeover and the target engaged a small/(large) auditor.  These results are 
consistent with acquiring firms perceiving large audit firms as having better quality. 
 
In a takeover a bidder is faced with information asymmetry over the “true value” of 
the target firm.  In a friendly takeover, the bidding firm can typically reduce the level 
of information asymmetry by conducting a due diligence.  In contrast, in hostile 
takeovers a bidder must rely on the target firm financial statements to value the target 
firm.  It is predicted that the degree of reliance on and confidence in this publicly 
available information will be influenced by the perceived quality of the financial 
statements.  As the function of an auditor is to attest to the financial statement 
information, this study argues that a greater level of credibility will be added to the 
target firm financial report when the target auditor is perceived by the acquiring firm 
as having a better reputation and a higher level of independence. 
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The prior literature on auditor reputation indicates that target firm financial statements 
have greater perceived credibility when a large auditor audits the firm.  Additionally, 
previous studies and regulatory concerns over the impact of NAS on the appearance 
of auditor independence suggest that financial statement credibility will be reduced 
when an auditor provides an increasing amount of NAS to an audit client.  This leads 
to the two hypotheses tested in this study: 
 
H1: In hostile takeovers takeover premiums are negatively related to the amount of 
NAS provided by the target firm auditor; 
 
H2: In hostile takeovers takeover premiums are positively related to the size of the 
target firm auditor. 
 
The reputation or independence of the target auditor is not expected to play an 
important role in friendly bids as the role of external financial information is lower in 
these takeovers.   Notwithstanding this expectation, we test the impact of auditor 
independence and reputation in both hostile and friendly takeovers. 
 
A possible countervailing influence when testing Hypothesis One is that firms 
purchasing greater amounts of NAS will have firm characteristics that attract a 
takeover offer.  For instance, complex target firms or firms in the process of 
restructuring are more likely to purchase NAS.  If these firm characteristics are also 
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associated with the likelihood of becoming a takeover target, then NAS will result in 
higher rather than lower takeover premiums.6 
 
3. Research design 
Takeover premiums (Prem) are calculated for Australian target firms by subtracting 
the return on the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index over the period commencing 60 
days prior to the takeover announcement and ending 30 days afterwards from the 
target firm returns over the same period.7  The Core Research Database maintained by 
the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) was used to source 
target firm share prices. 
 
The testing of Hypothesis One requires a proxy for the appearance of target firm 
auditor independence (AUDINDEP).  If target firm auditor independence is an issue 
for the acquiring firm, then an assessment of independence is likely to be conducted 
using the target firm NAS fee disclosures.  As stated by Ashbaugh, et al. (2003), the 
perception of independence as viewed by regulators and the general public is more 
likely to be captured by the fee ratio than the total fees paid by a firm to an auditor at 
either the audit firm level or audit office level.  The first two measures of auditor 
independence are variants of the fee ratio used in earlier research.  The first proxy 
takes the ratio of NAS fees to total fees (RNASTOT), whilst the second proxy is the 
ratio of NAS fees to audit fees (RNASAUD).  The final measure of auditor 
independence is the natural logarithm of the NAS fee (LNNAS).  All three measures 
are observed at the target firm level and are hand collected from the most recent 
                                                 
6 We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this alternative prediction for NAS and takeover 
premiums. 
7 The companies included in the index represent over 95% (by value) of companies listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange. The index assumes all dividends are reinvested into the stock. 
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annual financial statements available to the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
before the takeover announcement.8  Annual reports are sourced from Huntley’s 
Aspect FinAnalysis database. 
 
Hypothesis Two is tested using an indicator variable which denotes target firms 
audited by a large auditor (AUDREP).9  The identity of the auditor preceding the 
takeover announcement is collected from the most recent target firm financial report 
issued before the takeover announcement.10,11 
 
Financial statement credibility will be reduced if the auditor has issued a qualified 
audit opinion.  A dummy variable (QUALIFIED) is used to indicate takeovers in 
which the target auditor issued a qualified audit opinion on the financial statements 
for the year prior to the takeover.12  As a control for target firm earnings quality 
(EARNQUAL), we use the ratio of cash flows from operations to profit after tax.13 
 
Earlier studies have identified additional variables which need to be controlled for in a 
model of takeover premiums.  As cash takeovers expose shareholders to an immediate 
                                                 
8 Audit and NAS fees are a required disclosure in Australia for the entire sample period. 
9 Over the period of this study (i.e., 1996 to 2006), the number of large auditing firms decreased from 
six to four following the merger of Coopers and Lybrand with Price Waterhouse in 1997 and the 
demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002.   The AUDREP variable is coded as one for target firms audited by 
any of these audit firms. 
10 To ensure that the auditor at the date of the takeover was identical to that which was engaged on the 
financial statements released prior to the takeover announcement, a search was made of announcements 
made to the ASX to identify auditor switches.  A change in auditor was identified for one target firm, 
which was deleted from the sample. 
11 As the purpose of this study is to focus on whether the appearance of auditor independence and 
reputation influence takeover premiums, we do not include measures of actual auditor quality or 
independence (e.g., discretionary accruals or the rate of client audit report qualifications by audit firm).  
Instead, we focus on measures of independence and reputation easily observable by an investor. 
12 For the purposes of this study a qualification was defined to include both a qualified opinion and a 
statement from the auditor that there is an inherent uncertainty in the accounts (e.g., due to going 
concern issues).  Audit qualifications were identified by reading through the auditor’s report attached to 
the financial statements. 
13 All accounting information needed to measure the variables in the model is collected from the 
financial statements released for the financial year immediately preceding the takeover announcement. 
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tax liability, they have been documented to be associated with increased takeover 
premiums (e.g., Huang & Walkling, 1987; Franks, Harris & Mayer, 1988; Draper & 
Paudyal, 1999; Da Silva Rosa, Izan, Steinback & Walter, 2000 and Bugeja, 2005a).  
Method of payment (PAYT) is controlled using an indicator variable denoting 
takeovers in which the takeover consideration is exclusively cash.  The payment type 
is identified from bidder takeover documents lodged with the ASX. 
 
The Bidders Statement lodged with the ASX is used to obtain the bidding firm 
toehold interest (TOEHOLD) in the target.  Previous research suggests a negative 
association between takeover premiums and the bidder’s toehold (Stulz, 1988; Stulz, 
Walkling & Song 1990; Bugeja & Walter 1995; and Sudarsanam, et al. 1996).  
Competing takeover offers for a target are identified using an indicator variable coded 
as one (MULTIPLE) if there is more than one simultaneous bidder for the target.  It is 
expected that takeover premiums will be higher when there are multiple bidders. 
 
Following the approach of Schwert (2000), target firm return on equity (ROE) is used 
as a control for firm performance.  As in Schwert (2000) and Bugeja (2005a), target 
firm growth is proxied using the target firm market-to-book ratio (MB).  The natural 
logarithm of target firm market capitalisation (TGTSIZE) is included as a control for 
size.14  Prior research has found that target size is negatively related to takeover 
premiums in Australia (Anderson, Haynes & Heaney, 1994) and insignificant in the 
US (Betton, Eckbo & Thorburn, 2009).  The previous two variables are measured as 
at balance date for the financial year end before the takeover announcement. 
 
                                                 
14 The results are not sensitive to measuring size or market-to-book using the market capitalisation of 
the target firm two months prior to the takeover announcement. 
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Israel (1991) and Israel (1992) argue that firms with higher leverage will have a more 
concentrated share ownership structure resulting in higher takeover premiums.  
Leverage is included in the model using the target firm debt to equity ratio (DE).  To 
control for the target firm information environment, a dummy variable is used 
indicating target firms which had analyst following for the financial year-ended prior 
to the takeover (ACOV) announcement.  Analyst following information is obtained 
from the IBES historical database.  The model includes target firm bankruptcy risk 
measured using the Altman (1968) bankruptcy prediction model (ALTZ).  Earlier 
research shows that takeover premiums are lower for target firms with higher 
bankruptcy risk (Amit, Livnat & Zarowin, 1989).  Year and industry indicator 
variables are included in the model to control for year and industry effects. 
 
The full model estimated separately for hostile and friendly takeovers is: 
 
PREMi = αi + β1AUDINDEPi + β2AUDREPi + β3QUALIFIEDi + β4EARNQUALi +  
β5PAYTi + β6TOEHOLDi + β7MULTIPLEi + β8DEi + β9ROEi + β10MBi + 
β11TGTSIZEi + β12ACOV + iβ13ALTZi  + INDUSTRY + YEAR +  εi   (1) 
where AUDINDEP is defined alternately as the: 
 
 RNASTOT Ratio of NAS fees to total fees paid to the target firm auditor 
RNASAUD Ratio of NAS fees to audit fees paid to the target firm auditor 
LNNAS Natural log of NAS fees 
 
To control for heteroskedasticity, all reported t-statistics from estimating the takeover 
premium model are based on White’s (1980) consistent covariance estimator. 
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4. Sample and descriptive statistics  
All takeovers for ASX listed firms from 1996 to 2006 are identified from the Connect 
4’s Mergers and Acquisitions Database.15  This search identified 593 takeovers.  The 
announcement date of the takeover was found by searching through announcements 
made to the ASX available on Huntley’s Aspect FinAnalysis database.  It was 
necessary to exclude takeovers that had insufficient information available to estimate 
model (1) leaving 547 takeovers in the final sample.  A takeover was classified as 
hostile if the initial recommendation of the target firm board in its Target Statement to 
shareholders was that the offer be rejected.  A temporal distribution of the sample 
partitioned by the attitude of the target firm board is provided in Panel A of Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
There is no discernible trend in takeover activity with the number of takeovers at their 
highest in the first and last year of the sample.  Approximately 48% of offers are 
hostile.  It is noticeable, however, that the frequency of hostile takeovers varies across 
years.  Panel B of Table 1 presents a distribution of target firms classified into the 24 
ASX industry sector codes.  Within the sample, 13% of the targets are involved in 
gold mining and 16% are classified as miscellaneous industrials. 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables incorporated into model (1).  
Consistent with earlier studies, (e.g., Bargeron, et al. 2008; Bugeja 2005a and 
Constantinou, et al. 2005) target shareholders receive significant positive abnormal 
returns around the takeover announcement with the mean and median return being 
                                                 
15 No private target firms are included in the sample. 
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27% and 23% respectively.  On average, NAS fees are 34% of the total fee received 
by the target firm auditor.16  This statistic is slightly higher than the ratio of 29% 
reported in the Australian study by Ruddock, et al. (2006).17  The statistics for 
RNASAUD indicate that the average fee paid for NAS is approximately equal to the 
audit fee, raising the possibility that financial statement users perceive an impairment 
of audit independence.  However, NAS fees have a wide range relative to audit fees, 
ranging from zero to being over twelve times as large.  Big 4 auditors are engaged by 
76% of target firms.  Approximately 8% of target firms are issued with a qualified 
audit report in the year prior to the takeover.18  Mean and median target firm market 
capitalisation are respectively $332 million and $50.9 million. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The last three columns of Table 2 compare averages for each variable across auditor 
type.  The comparison indicates that large auditors provide a significantly higher level 
of NAS than small auditors.  In addition, and as would be expected, clients of Big 4 
auditors are significantly larger, have lower bankruptcy risk and are more likely to 
have analyst following.  Providing initial evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
takeover premiums are significantly higher for targets audited by a Big 4 auditor.19 
 
                                                 
16 It is not possible to provide a breakdown of NAS fees into different categories of NAS as the vast 
majority of disclosures of NAS fees simply provide a total of other fees paid to auditors.  It was only 
after the introduction of the CLERP reforms in 2004 that the details of NAS fees had to be provided. 
17 The difference in RNASTOT in this study to that found in Ruddock et al. (2006) is likely a result of 
sample composition.  This study consists of target firms which are generally relatively smaller entities.  
Further, the sample period between the two studies is inconsistent. 
18 Approximately 70% of these observations are a statement by the auditor that the entity is subject to 
inherent uncertainty due to going concern issues. 
19 As a means of comparison with the target firms in the sample Huntley’s Aspect FinAnalysis database 
was used to obtain median values for: the natural logarithm of market capitalisation, return on equity, 
debt-to-equity and market-to book ratios for non-sample firms for the period 1996 to 2006.  The 
median values were respectively: 17.13, 1.94%, 9.22% and 1.24. 
 19 
Correlation coefficients between the dependent and independent variables in model 
(1) are presented in Table 3.  The correlation between takeover premiums and the 
three measures of auditor independence do not support Hypothesis One.  The only 
significant correlation (LNNAS) is positive and not the predicted negative sign.  As 
expected, there is a high degree of correlation between the three measures of auditor 
independence.  Consistent with Hypothesis Two, the correlation between the takeover 
premium and auditor reputation is positive and significant.  There is a significant 
positive correlation between the use of large audit firms and the three auditor 
independence measures.  Although there is significant correlation between various 
control variables, the size of the correlation indicates that multicollinearity will not be 
a problem with the estimation of model (1) (Gujarati, 1995). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Estimation of the takeover premium model 
The results of estimating regression model (1) are presented in Panels A and B of 
Table 4 for respectively hostile and friendly takeovers.  Given the significant 
correlation between each auditor independence measure and auditor size the model is 
estimated separately to test each Hypothesis.20  The test of Hypothesis One, which 
uses sequentially each proxy for auditor independence, is shown in columns (1) 
through (3).  The results in Panel A provide no support for Hypothesis One.  The 
findings from testing Hypothesis Two are presented in column (4).  The coefficient on 
the large auditor dummy variable is positive and significant.  The size of the 
                                                 
20 The conclusions do not change if auditor size is included in model (1) with alternatively each auditor 
independence proxy. 
 20 
coefficient indicates that target shareholders receive an additional premium of 8.3% 
when a reputable auditor audits the target firm. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The results for friendly takeovers are provided in Panel B of Table 4.  Similar to the 
results for hostile takeovers, the coefficient on the auditor independence measures are 
insignificant.  Additionally, the auditor reputation variable is insignificant.  This 
finding indicates that if bidders are able to make their own assessment on financial 
statement credibility, the target firm auditor reputation is unimportant in offer pricing. 
 
In both hostile and friendly takeovers, target firm abnormal returns are positively 
related to the target firm debt-to-equity ratio and negatively associated with the target 
firm market-to-book ratio.  The negative impact of market-to-book is possibly 
explained by bidders offering a lower premium when target value represents growth 
options as the potential for overpayment is higher in these circumstances.  The 
positive relationship between takeover premiums and target firm leverage is 
consistent with the results in Raad, Ryan and Sinkey (1999). 
 
The significant findings for many of the other controls are sensitive to whether the bid 
is hostile or friendly.  For instance, the earnings quality measure is positively related 
to takeover premiums in friendly bids and negatively associated in hostile takeovers.  
These findings are inconsistent with the US findings in Raman, et al. (2008).  A 
possible interpretation of our findings is that in friendly takeovers the bidder through 
due diligence is able to substantiate the level of earnings quality and is willing to pay 
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a higher premium due to the lower risk of earnings not being realised as cash flows 
post- takeover.  In contrast, in hostile bids as the bidding firm cannot access the 
records of the target firm, it discounts the value of high quality earnings due to its 
inability to verify the accuracy of the information.21 
 
In friendly takeovers, there is a negative association between target firm return on 
equity and takeover premiums.  In contrast, target firm performance is insignificant in 
hostile bids.  These results suggests bidding firms are willing to pay a higher premium 
for an underperforming firm only if the target management are supportive of the 
takeover.  Additionally, in hostile bids takeover premiums are higher in takeovers 
when cash is offered as payment and the bidder has a lower toehold.  These variables 
are, however, insignificant in friendly takeovers.  The results in Henry (2005) provide 
a partial explanation for the differences in findings across target firm attitude to the 
takeover.  That study finds that accept recommendations in Australian takeovers are 
significantly more likely when equity is offered as payment and the acquiring firm has 
a higher toehold.  It is, therefore, expected that the impact on premiums of cash 
payment and low toeholds will be higher in the reject sub-sample. 
 
In friendly takeovers, analyst coverage and target firm size are respectively positively 
and negatively related to takeover premiums.  However, these variables are 
insignificant in hostile bids.  The negative association for target firm size is consistent 
with the results in Anderson, et al. (1994).  They use an information asymmetry 
explanation for the negative effect of target firm size on takeover premiums arguing 
                                                 
21 The findings for the earnings quality measure must be interpreted in the light of the unsophisticated 
measure of earnings quality employed in this study.  As assessing the association between earnings 
quality and takeover premiums is not the primary purpose of this study, it is left to further research to 
examine the relationship between more sophisticated earnings quality measures (e.g., Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002) and takeover premiums. 
 22 
that a takeover announcement contains more information content for a smaller firm.  
The Altman (1968) measure of bankruptcy risk is insignificant in friendly takeovers 
and negative in hostile takeovers.  The negative sign on bankruptcy risk is surprising 
and inconsistent with the results in Amit et al. (1989).  One possible explanation is 
that target firms with a higher risk of bankruptcy have a greater potential for post- 
takeover performance improvements. 
 
Pre- and post- the audit failures 
The audit failures that occurred in the early 2000s led to a wave of regulation which 
placed restrictions on the provision of NAS by auditors.  It is likely that these audit 
failures both damaged the reputation of large accounting firms and highlighted the 
potential independence issues resulting from the provision of NAS.  If these highly 
publicised audit failures focused bidding firms on the amount of NAS provided by 
target auditors, the greatest negative effect of NAS on takeover premiums will be 
found in hostile takeovers subsequent to the audit failures.  Furthermore, the 
perception that large auditors had a superior reputation is likely to have been tarnished 
following the adverse publicity surrounding these high profile audit failures.  As a 
result of this tarnished brand name it is possible that bidders would no longer be 
willing to pay an additional premium for targets audited by a Big 4 auditor. 
 
To test whether the results of the two hypotheses are sensitive to whether the takeover 
was announced before or after the auditing scandals, we introduce a dummy variable 
into regression model (1) that denotes takeovers announced from 2002 onwards 
(POST01).  This dummy variable is then interacted respectively with each of the three 
auditor independence measures and the auditor reputation variable.  The findings from 
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estimating this regression model are given in Table 5 with the results for hostile and 
friendly takeovers respectively in Panels A and B. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE  
 
The results continue to provide no support for Hypothesis One with all three measures 
of auditor independence insignificant both before and after 2002. The impact of 
auditor reputation on takeover premiums continues to be insignificant in friendly 
takeovers.  In hostile bids, however, the results are found to be sensitive to the time 
period during which the takeover was announced.  Although the coefficient on 
AUDREP is positive and significant, the interaction of this variable with POST01 
indicates a decline in the importance of auditor reputation in explaining takeover 
premiums after the auditing scandals.  This finding indicates that in the ‘minds’ of 
bidding firms the audit scandals diminished the reputation of the large auditing firms 
to the extent that the financial statements of their auditees were no more credible than 
those of other auditors.  The results on the control variables are largely unchanged 
from those shown in Table 4.  The coefficient on POST01 is insignificant indicating 
no temporal change in takeover premiums in the second half of the sample period. 
 
5.2 Sensitivity tests and additional analysis 
Deletion of zero NAS observations 
Approximately 70 (12.8%) target firms do not purchase any NAS from their auditors.  
To assess if the results are sensitive to the inclusion of these observations, the analysis 
is repeated after excluding these firms.  The results (not tabulated) are qualitatively 
unchanged from those presented. 
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Target firms with ‘high’ NAS fees 
To assess if auditor independence concerns only impact on takeover premiums when 
NAS fees are relatively high, the sample is partitioned at the median for each of the 
proxies for auditor independence.  The results are then re-estimated using only those 
observations above the median.  The coefficients (not tabulated) on each auditor 
independence proxy remained insignificant.22 
 
Large vs small auditors 
To examine if the effect of NAS on the appearance of auditor independence differs 
between Big4/non-Big 4 auditors, the sample was partitioned by auditor size and 
model (1) estimated for each auditor type.  For both types of auditor, the results for all 
three measures of auditor independence were insignificant. 
 
Industry specialists and second tier auditors 
Prior research is consistent with auditor industry specialists receiving an audit fee 
premium (e.g., Craswell, et al. 1995; Ferguson & Stokes, 2002; Ferguson, Francis & 
Stokes, 2003; Francis, Reichalt & Wang, 2005; Basioudis & Francis, 2007; Carson & 
Fargher, 2007 and Carson, 2009).23  Lim et al, (2008) report that industry specialist 
auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion in the presence of higher 
NAS, consistent with industry specialists demonstrating greater concern with 
protecting their reputation.  Reichult and Wang (2010) find that when an auditor is 
both a country and city-specific industry specialist, audit quality is increased.  To 
determine if additional takeover premiums are received by target firms engaging a 
                                                 
22 The sample was also partitioned into quartiles for each of the auditor independence variables and the 
takeover premium model estimated for the highest quartile.  The coefficients on the auditor 
independence measures continued to be insignificant. 
23 Across these studies, the results vary as to whether the industry specialist auditor fee premium is 
received at either or both the city level and national level. 
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specialist auditor, the regression analysis was repeated using only target firms with a 
Big 4 auditor.  In this analysis, the auditor reputation variable was replaced with an 
industry specialist variable.  The industry specialist was identified by taking all ASX 
listed firms in each year of the sample and defining the lead auditor in each industry 
in terms of total audit fees received as the industry specialist.  The coefficient on the 
industry specialist variable was insignificant.24 
 
Basioudis et al. (2007) reports that second tier accounting firms (i.e., Grant Thornton 
and BDO) receive a fee premium relative to third tier firms.  Therefore, it is possible 
that target firms engaging second tier auditors earn higher abnormal returns than those 
using third tier auditors.  To test this proposition, the regression model was adapted by 
including a dummy variable denoting targets audited by either Grant Thornton or 
BDO.  The results on the second tier dummy variable were insignificant and the 
conclusions from the auditor reputation variable were unchanged.25 
 
Listing status of the bidder 
The results presented include takeovers from both listed and unlisted bidders.  To 
determine if the listing status of the bidder influenced the results, the analysis was re-
estimated after including a dummy variable identifying listed bidders.  The coefficient 
on this variable was insignificant and the conclusion drawn from the other variables 
remained unchanged.  Additionally, the analysis was undertaken only for listed 
bidders.  The results were consistent with those presented in Tables 4 and 5.  As part 
of the analysis for listed bidders, two additional control variables were included in the 
                                                 
24 An industry specialist was defined alternatively as the auditor with the greatest number of clients in 
an industry.  The industry specialist variable remained insignificant. 
25  The second tier auditor dummy was also expanded to include PKF Chartered Accountants.  The 
coefficient remained insignificant. 
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regression model.  The first variable was the relative size of the target to the bidder, 
which reported an insignificant coefficient.  The other variable was an indicator 
variable denoting takeovers in which the target and bidder were in similar industries.  
This variable was positive and significant consistent with there being greater 
synergies when firms in related industries merge. 
 
Measure of abnormal returns 
Abnormal returns were also calculated over the following event windows around the 
takeover announcement: -60 days through +10 days; -30 days through +30 days and -
10 days through +10 days.  Regression model (1) was then re-estimated using each of 
the alternative event windows.  The results were in line with those presented.  As an 
additional test, abnormal returns were also measured using the market model with 
parameter coefficients estimated over the period -205 through -90 days prior to the 
takeover announcement.  Model (1) was then estimated for both the original event 
window and the additional event windows described above.  The results were once 
again consistent with the results in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
Identical auditors 
In situations that the same auditor audits the target and bidding firm, it is possible that 
the acquiring firm will be more confident of the level of credibility of the target firm 
financial statements.  To examine if having an identical auditor impacts on takeover 
premiums, model (1) was re-estimated including an additional dummy variable 
denoting identical auditors.  The coefficient on this variable was insignificant.26 
 
                                                 
26 This testing required the exclusion of takeovers with bidders not listed on the ASX.  Of the 
remaining 316 takeovers, identical auditors were present in 67 (21%) of cases. 
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Different auditor quality between the target and bidder 
After a successful takeover, most targets will switch to the bidder’s auditor 
(Anderson, et al. 1993 and Firth, 1999).  If share prices are discounted because of 
lower quality auditing, it is possible that target firms audited by a small auditor will 
experience higher abnormal returns when it receives a takeover from a bidder with a 
large auditor.  Testing this conjecture, we re-estimated model (1) including a dummy 
variable denoting takeovers in which the acquiring firm engages a large auditor and 
the target firm uses a small auditor.27  This variable was insignificant.28 
 
Does auditor reputation return to significance? 
The results in Table 5 indicate that post 2001, the impact of auditor reputation on 
takeover premiums declined.  To examine if the reputation of auditors improved in the 
later years of the sample, model (1) was re-estimated for hostile takeovers 
alternatively for the period 2004 to 2006 and 2005 and 2006.  In both cases, the 
coefficient on AUDREP was insignificant. 
 
Qualified opinions and the independence of auditors 
In the case that a qualified audit opinion is issued by the auditor, there is likely to be 
lower concern that the auditor is not acting independently.  As a result, Hypothesis 1 
is less likely to be supported for these target firms.  To ensure target firms with 
qualified audit reports did not influence the results, the analysis was undertaken after 
excluding targets with qualified audit opinions.  The findings were unchanged. 
 
 
                                                 
27 This analysis was conducted using only takeovers in which the bidding firm was listed on the ASX. 
28 A dummy variable was also used to determine if targets earned a lower abnormal return if they had a 
Big 4 auditor and the acquiring firm had a non-Big 4 auditor.  The result was insignificant. 
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Target firms in financial distress 
Prior evidence suggests that auditors receiving higher NAS are less likely to issue a 
going concern qualification to firms in financial distress (e.g., Sharma et al. 2001 and 
Basioudis et al. 2008).  If auditors are more likely to compromise their independence 
in this situation, it would be expected that firms making a takeover of a financially 
distressed target would have heightened concerns regarding auditor independence.  To 
assess if this is the case, Hypothesis One is examined by restricting the sample to 
target firms considered to be in financial distress.  As in DeFond et al. (2002) 
financial distress is defined as firms reporting negative cash flow from operations or a 
net loss in the financial report issued in the year prior to the takeover announcement.  
The coefficients on the auditor independence variables remained insignificant.29 
 
Dated financial information 
The accounting information, auditor reputation and auditor independence variables in 
the regression models are extracted from the last set of target financial statements 
released prior to the takeover announcement.  A possible issue arising therefore is that 
the information is dated and no longer relevant when the takeover is announced.  This 
issue is addressed in two ways.  Firstly, a time lag variable is included in the 
regression model.  This variable is calculated as the natural logarithm of the number 
of days between the financial statement balance date and the takeover announcement 
date.  The coefficient on this variable was insignificant and the conclusions drawn 
from the other variables were unchanged.  Secondly, the regression models were re-
                                                 
29 Alternative definitions of financial distress were also employed.  In each case, the coefficients on the 
auditor independence variables remained insignificant.  One alternative definition of financial distress 
was those target firms with negative retained earnings or negative working capital.  A second definition 
was to limit the sample to targets with a going concern opinion and a matched target firm.  The match 
was identified as the target firm in the same industry with the closest Altman (1968) z-score. 
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estimated using only takeovers announced within six months of the release of the 
previous financial statements.  The conclusions remained identical to those presented. 
 
Self-selection bias 
One possible concern with the finding of a positive association between Big 4 
auditors and takeover premiums is that characteristics associated with the choice of a 
large auditor are driving the findings.  To control for self-selection, model (1) was re-
estimated after including the number of subsidiaries and the proportion of foreign 
subsidiaries controlled by the target firm at balance date for the year prior to the 
takeover.  These variables are measures of complexity and partially control for the 
choice of a Big 4 auditor.  The coefficients on both these variables were insignificant 
and the other results remained unchanged.  Notwithstanding this finding it is still 
possible that the findings for Hypothesis Two are driven by self-selection. 
 
Pooled sample 
The analysis was also repeated for the full sample with the inclusion of an indicator 
variable indicating takeovers where the initial recommendation of the target board is 
offer acceptance.  The coefficient on the board recommendation and the auditor 
independence measures were insignificant.  The findings for the auditor reputation 
variable were identical to those shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
This study extends recent research assessing whether NAS impairs the “appearance” 
of auditor independence.  The context used is the hostile takeover of a publicly listed 
company as this involves a major corporate investment decision undertaken in an 
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environment of information uncertainty.  The results show no association between 
target firm NAS and takeover premiums.  This finding indicates that bidding firms do 
not perceive that higher NAS impacts financial statement quality and credibility or, if 
it does, the reduction in credibility is insufficient to influence their pricing decision.  
From a policy perspective this result indicates that regulatory action restricting NAS 
may have been unjustified.  An alternative explanation for the findings in this study is 
that firm characteristics associated with the purchase of NAS result in a firm 
becoming subject to a takeover offer.  If these characteristics lead to higher takeover 
premiums, this effect will counteract any negative impact arising from independence 
concerns. 
 
This study also analyses whether targets using a more reputable auditor receive a 
higher takeover premium.  The results indicate that premiums in hostile takeovers are 
significantly higher when a large auditor audits the target.  This result, however, is 
only significant in the period prior to the corporate failures that occurred in the early 
part of this century.  This finding is consistent with these accounting scandals 
tarnishing the reputation of large auditing firms to the extent that the credibility of 
target firm financial statements was considered equivalent across auditor firm size. 
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Table 1 
Time and industry distribution of sample 
Takeovers announced for ASX listed targets between 1996 and 2006 are identified from the Connect 4 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database.  The year of takeover refers to the year in which the takeover was 
announced.  The attitude of the target firm board is based on the initial recommendation of the target 
firm board to shareholders. 
 
Panel A: Year distribution and attitude    
Year Friendly  Hostile Total 
1996 25 (41%) 36 (59%) 61 
1997 24 (62%) 15 (38%) 39 
1998 25 (47%) 28 (53%) 53 
1999 18 (38%) 29 (62%) 47 
2000 29 (50%) 29 (50%) 58 
2001 31 (62%) 19 (38%) 50 
2002 22 (50%) 22 (50%) 44 
2003 26 (53%) 23 (47%) 49 
2004 20 (49%) 21 (51%) 41 
2005 22 (61%) 14 (39%) 36 
2006 42 (61%) 27 (39%) 69 
Total 284 (52%) 263 (48%) 547 
Panel B: Industry distribution of targets      
ASX Industry No. Percentage ASX Industry No. Percentage 
1 Mining - Gold 70 13% 13 Retail 23 4% 
2 Mining - 
Other Metals 33 6% 14 Transport 12 2% 
3 Solid Fuels 7 1% 15 Media 24 4% 
4 Energy 28 5% 16 Banks 0 0% 
5 Infrastructure 
and Utilties 16 3% 17 Insurance 7 1% 
6 Developers 
and Contractors 15 3% 18 Telecommunications 24 4% 
7 Building 
Materials 14 3% 
19 Investment and 
Financial Services 40 7% 
8 Alcohol and 
Tobacco 16 3% 20 Property Trusts 24 4% 
9 Food and 
Household 21 4% 
21 Healthcare and 
Biotechnology 22 4% 
10 Chemicals 6 1% 
22 Miscellaneous 
Industrials 90 16% 
11 Engineering 10 2% 
23 Diversified 
Industrials 15 3% 
12 Paper and 
Packaging 4 1% 24 Tourism and Leisure 26 5% 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables in model (1) for the entire sample and 
separately by auditor size.  A test of statistical difference across auditor size for each variable is also 
shown.  A t-test is used for continuous variables and a χ2-test for binary variables.  PREM is the 
abnormal return over the event window (-60,+30) days around the takeover announcement.  Auditor 
independence is measured using three variables: RNASTOT is the ratio of NAS fees to total fees, 
RNASAUD is the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees and LNNAS is the natural logarithm of NAS fees.  
AUDREP is a binary variable noting firms audited by a Big 4 auditor.  QUALIFIED is an indicator 
variable noting target firms which received a qualified audit report, PAYT is an indicator variable set to 
1 if the payment form is exclusively cash, MULTIPLE is an indicator variable set to 1 if there are 
multiple bidders for the target firm and ACOV is an indicator variable set to 1 if the target firm has 
analyst coverage.  TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of the bidding firm in the target at the 
announcement of the takeover.  EARNQUAL is the ratio of cash flow from operations to net profit after 
tax, TGTSIZE is the natural logarithm of the target firm’s market capitalisation, DE is the target firm’s 
debt-to-equity ratio, ROE is the target firm’s return on equity ratio, MB is the target firm’s market-to-
book ratio and ALTZ is the Altman Z-score.  All accounting and auditing variables are collected from 
the financial statements released before the takeover announcement. 
 
Variable Mean Median Std dev Big 4 Non-Big 4 Stat diff  
PREM 0.2729 0.2300 0.3755 0.2936 0.2077 2.39** 
RNASTOT 0.3442 0.3202 0.2404 0.3641 0.2816 3.53*** 
RNASAUD 0.9170 0.4710 1.3846 1.0096 0.6267 3.76*** 
LNNAS 9.5123 10.6690 3.9358 9.9712 7.9037 5.22*** 
AUDREP 0.7557 1.0000 0.4299 - - - 
QUALIFIED 0.0841 0.0000 0.2778 0.0726 0.1194 -1.69 
EARNQUAL 1.5795 0.8294 13.3303 1.0089 3.3381 -1.23 
PAYT 0.6737 1.0000 0.4684 0.6998 0.6119 1.89 
TOEHOLD 0.1687 0.1272 0.2121 0.1903 0.1507 1.50 
MULTIPLE 0.2462 0.0000 0.4299 0.2591 0.1940 1.53 
DE 1.2854 0.7243 4.8934 1.8340 1.0420 1.44 
ROE -0.0071 0.0541 2.1900 0.0306 -0.0946 0.98 
MB 2.6947 1.2369 13.5685 3.3358 2.1443 1.26 
TGTSIZE 17.8251 17.7438 1.7674 18.0621 17.0948 6.55*** 
ACOV 0.4962 0.0000 0.5005 0.5400 0.2910 5.36*** 
ALTZ 0.9028 0.6258 0.8645 0.9550 0.7836 2.26** 
*** Significant at the 1% level                          ** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 3 
Correlation coefficients and two-tailed p-values for the dependent and independent variables in the takeover premium model 
Correlation coefficients for the variables in model (1). PREM is the abnormal return over the event window (-60,+30) days around the takeover announcement.  Auditor 
independence is measured using three variables: RNASTOT is the ratio of NAS fees to total fees, RNASAUD is the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees and LNNAS is the natural 
logarithm of NAS fees.  AUDREP is a binary variable noting firms audited by a Big 4 auditor.  QUALIFIED is an indicator variable noting target firms which received a 
qualified audit report, PAYT is an indicator variable set to 1 if the payment form is exclusively cash, MULTIPLE is an indicator variable set to 1 if there are multiple bidders 
for the target firm and ACOV is an indicator variable set to 1 if the target firm has analyst coverage.  TOEHOLD is the ownership interest of the bidding firm in the target at 
the announcement of the takeover.  EARNQUAL is the ratio of cash flow from operations to net profit after tax, TGTSIZE is the natural logarithm of the target firm’s market 
capitalisation, DE is the target firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, ROE is the target firm’s return on equity ratio, MB is the target firm’s market-to-book ratio and ALTZ is the Altman 
Z-score.  FRIENDLY is an indicator variable set to 1 if the directors recommend bid acceptance.  All accounting and auditing variables are collected from the financial statements 
released before the takeover announcement.  Pearson correlations are below the diagonal and Spearman correlations are above. 
 
 PREM RNASTOT RNASAUD LNNAS AUDREP QUALIFIED EARNQUAL PAYT TOEHOLD MULTIPLE DE ROE MB TGTSIZE ACOV ALTZ FRIENDLY 
PREM 1 .069 .069 .130*** 0.080* -.113** .062 .181** .019 .044 .064 .003 -.047 .135*** .190*** .052 0.033*** 
RNASTOT .029 1 1.000*** .766*** .147*** -.038 -.007 -.013 .005 .012 .047 .101** .015 .187*** .210*** -.052 -.037 
RNASAUD -.018 .777*** 1 .766*** .147*** -.038 -.007 -.013 .005 .012 .047 .101** .015 .187*** .210*** -.052 -.037 
LNNAS .076 .715*** .413*** 1 .327*** -.089** 0.081* .053 -.030 .006 .221*** .172*** -.011 .509*** .464*** .136*** -.005 
AUDREP .098** .148*** .120*** .227*** 1 -0.072* .013 0.081* 0.071* .065 .029 0.071* -.061 .241*** .211*** 0.074* .022 
QUALIFIED -0.0861* -.034 -.024 -.059 -0.072* 1 -.085** -0.073* -.036 .043 .015 -.224*** -.005 -.217*** -0.109** -0.162*** .067 
EARNQUAL .030 -.030 -.020 -.007 -0.075* -.008 1 .024 -.033 .003 .038 .278*** .048 .199*** .136*** .014 -.011 
PAYT .150*** -.016 -.013 .028 0.081* -0.073* .024 1 .141*** 0.080* 0.080* .024 -.107** -.017 .027 .197*** .019 
TOEHOLD -.028 -.012 -.011 -.004 .047 -.030 .010 .101** 1 -.109** .123*** -.017 -.007 -.041 -0.074* .060 0.080** 
MULTIPLE .056 .000 -.019 -.009 .065 .043 -.039 0.080* -.107** 1 .065 -.033 .023 0.079* .098** -0.087** -.180*** 
DE .011 .034 .050 -.014 .036 .117*** -.006 -.034 .031 -.031 1 0.082* .202*** .111*** .168*** .338*** .044 
ROE -.059 .041 .019 .060 .025 .015 .004 .007 -.056 -.024 .147*** 1 .146*** .360*** .158*** .208*** .026 
MB -.032 -.002 .020 -.051 .032 .068 -.010 -.019 .035 -.046 .493*** .067 1 .281*** -.024 0.076* .017 
TGTSIZE .049 .174*** .133*** .335*** .216*** -.191*** .024 -.036 -.006 0.080* -.092** .058 -.063 1 .628*** .019 .008 
ACOV .136*** .208*** .157*** .344*** .211*** -.108** .013 .027 -.016 .098** -.040 .087** .071 .531*** 1 .063 -.004 
ALTZ .054. -0.049 -.060 .097** .083* -.109** .035 .131*** .032 -.098** .090** -.022 .058 -.027 .033 1 .082** 
FRIENDLY .031 -.037 -.001 -.011 .022 .067 -0.07* .019 .150*** -.180*** 0.073* 0.078* .005 .018 -.004 .045 1 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
Table 4 
Model of takeover premiums and auditor independence and reputation 
Results of estimating model (1):  PREMi = αi + β1AUDINDEPi + β2AUDREPi + β3QUALIFIEDi + β4EARNQUALi 
+ β5PAYTi + + β6TOEHOLDi + β7MULTIPLEi + β8DEi + β9ROEi + β10MBi + β11TGTSIZEi  + β12ACOVi  + 
β13ALTZi + εi.  PREM is the abnormal return over the event window (-60,+30) days around the takeover 
announcement.  Auditor independence is measured using three variables: RNASTOT is the ratio of NAS fees to 
total fees, RNASAUD is the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees and LNNAS is the natural logarithm of NAS fees.  
AUDREP is a binary variable noting firms audited by a Big 4 auditor.  QUALIFIED is an indicator variable noting 
target firms which received a qualified audit report, PAYT is an indicator variable set to 1 if the payment form is 
exclusively cash, MULTIPLE is an indicator variable set to 1 if there are multiple bidders for the target firm and 
ACOV is an indicator variable set to 1 if the target firm has analyst coverage.  TOEHOLD is the ownership interest 
of the bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover.  EARNQUAL is the ratio of cash flow from 
operations to net profit after tax, TGTSIZE is the natural logarithm of the target firm’s market capitalisation, DE is 
the target firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, ROE is the target firm’s return on equity ratio, MB is the target firm’s market-
to-book ratio and ALTZ is the Altman Z-score.  All accounting and auditing variables are collected from the 
financial statements released before the takeover announcement.  Industry and year indicator variables are also 
included in the model but the results are not reported.  t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Hostile takeovers (n=263)     
Intercept 0.0104 
(0.07) 
0.0113 
(0.08) 
0.0025 
(0.02) 
0.0076 
(0.05) 
RNASTOT 0.0009 
(0.01) 
- - - 
RNASAUD - 
 
-0.0103 
(-0.55) 
- - 
LNNAS - 
 
- 0.0038 
(0.60) 
- 
AUDREP - - - 0.0834 
(1.73)* 
QUALIFIED -0.0554 
(-0.73) 
-0.0530 
(-0.70) 
-0.0594 
(-0.76) 
-0.0528 
(-0.68) 
EARNQUAL -0.0009 
(-2.38)** 
-0.0010 
(-2.49)** 
-0.0009 
(-2.43)** 
-0.0708 
(-1.68)* 
PAYT 0.1720 
(3.49)*** 
0.1737 
(3.55)*** 
0.1708 
(3.47)*** 
0.1685 
(3.45)*** 
TOEHOLD -0.0421 
(-2.61)*** 
-0.0427 
(-2.69)** 
-0.0416 
(-2.59)*** 
-0.0436 
(-2.70)*** 
MULTIPLE 0.0553 
(1.20) 
0.0549 
(1.19) 
0.0564 
(1.22) 
0.0522 
(1.33) 
DE 0.0503 
(2.19)** 
0.0496 
(2.16)** 
0.0481 
(2.11)** 
0.0470 
(2.06)** 
ROE 0.0421 
(1.44) 
0.0412 
(1.40) 
0.0382 
(1.32) 
0.0384 
(1.31) 
MB -0.0171 
(-2.13)** 
-0.0169 
(-2.09)** 
-0.0164 
(-2.05)** 
-0.0160 
(-2.00)** 
TGTSIZE 0.0086 
(1.06) 
0.0090 
(1.11) 
0.0073 
(0.88) 
0.0067 
(0.79) 
ACOV 0.0527 
(1.11) 
0.0574 
(1.21) 
0.0459 
(0.95) 
0.0445 
(0.90) 
ALTZ -0.0728 
(-2.65)*** 
-0.0747 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.0734 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.0769 
(-2.86)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.0764 0.0776 0.0778 0.0820 
F-stat 2.751*** 2.780*** 2.786*** 2.890*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level                          ** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 4 – continued  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel B: Friendly takeovers (n=284)     
Intercept 0.7865 
(2.20)** 
0.7822 
(2.18)** 
0.7897 
(2.14)** 
0.7901 
(2.20)** 
RNASTOT -0.0110 
(-0.10) 
- - - 
RNASAUD - 
 
-0.0114 
(-0.34) 
- - 
LNNAS - 
 
- 0.0009 
(0.13) 
- 
AUDREP - - - 0.0539 
(0.95) 
QUALIFIED -0.1357 
(-1.61) 
-0.1381 
(-1.65) 
-0.1356 
(-1.60) 
-0.1359 
(-1.63) 
EARNQUAL 0.0044 
(2.54)** 
0.0044 
(2.55)** 
0.0044 
(2.54)** 
0.0045 
(2.62)*** 
PAYT 0.0777 
(1.40) 
0.0770 
(1.39) 
0.0780 
(1.41) 
0.0750 
(1.36) 
TOEHOLD -0.0702 
(-0.82) 
-0.0697 
(-0.82) 
-0.0703 
(-0.82) 
-0.0771 
(-0.89) 
MULTIPLE -0.0051 
(-0.09) 
-0.0077 
(-0.14) 
-0.0044 
(-0.81) 
-0.0078 
(-0.14) 
DE 0.0322 
(2.32)** 
0.0323 
(2.35)** 
0.0322 
(2.34)** 
0.0330 
(2.40)** 
ROE -0.0152 
(-4.93)*** 
-0.0153 
(-4.98)*** 
-0.0153 
(-4.87)*** 
-0.0153 
(-4.78)*** 
MB -0.0124 
(-2.53)** 
-0.0125 
(-2.56)** 
-0.0124 
(-2.54)** 
-0.0127 
(-2.61)*** 
TGTSIZE -0.0360 
(-1.80)* 
-0.0354 
(-1.77)* 
-0.0368 
(-1.70)* 
-0.0384 
(-1.87)* 
ACOV 0.1629 
(2.66)*** 
0.1653 
(2.70)*** 
0.1610 
(2.64)*** 
0.1585 
(2.62)*** 
ALTZ 0.0316 
(0.83) 
0.0307 
(0.81) 
0.0311 
(0.82) 
0.0306 
(0.81) 
Adjusted R2 0.0578 0.0597 0.0578 0.0609 
F-stat 2.359*** 2.408*** 2.360*** 2.439*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level                          ** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 5 
Model of takeover premiums and auditor independence and reputation before and after auditing 
scandals 
Results of estimating model (1) after the inclusion of an indicator variable denoting takeovers announced after 
2001 (POST01).  This dummy variable is interacted with the three measures of auditor independence and the 
auditor reputation variable.  The dependent variable is the abnormal return over the event window (-60,+30) days 
around the takeover announcement.  Auditor independence is measured using three variables: RNASTOT is the 
ratio of NAS fees to total fees, RNASAUD is the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees and LNNAS is the natural 
logarithm of NAS fees.  AUDREP is a binary variable noting firms audited by a Big 4 auditor.  QUALIFIED is an 
indicator variable noting target firms which received a qualified audit report, PAYT is an indicator variable set to 1 
if the payment form is exclusively cash, MULTIPLE is an indicator variable set to 1 if there are multiple bidders 
for the target firm and ACOV is an indicator variable set to 1 if the target firm has analyst coverage.  TOEHOLD is 
the ownership interest of the bidding firm in the target at the announcement of the takeover.  EARNQUAL is the 
ratio of cash flow from operations to net profit after tax, TGTSIZE is the natural logarithm of the target firm’s 
market capitalisation, DE is the target firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, ROE is the target firm’s return on equity ratio, 
MB is the target firm’s market-to-book ratio and ALTZ is the Altman Z-score.  All accounting and auditing 
variables are collected from the financial statements released before the takeover announcement.  Industry and 
year indicator variables are also included in the model but the results are not reported.  t-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Hostile takeovers (n=263)     
Intercept 0.0329 
(0.22) 
0.0113 
(0.08) 
0.0245 
(0.15) 
-0.0356 
(-0.23) 
RNASTOT -0.0478 
(-0.38) 
- - - 
RNASTOT*POST01 0.0699 
(0.40) 
- - - 
RNASAUD - 
 
-0.0151 
(-0.62) 
- - 
RNASAUD*POST01 - 0.0002 
(0.01) 
- - 
LNNAS - 
 
- 0.0023 
(0.24) 
- 
LNNAS*POST01  - 0.0042 
(0.38) 
- 
AUDREP - - - 0.1722 
(2.53)** 
AUDREP*POST01 - - - -0.2602 
(-2.87)*** 
POST01 -0.1032 
(-1.41) 
-0.0828 
(-1.59) 
-0.1185 
(-1.01) 
0.1180 
(1.52) 
QUALIFIED -0.0511 
(-0.66) 
-0.0520 
(-0.67) 
-0.0599 
(-0.76) 
-0.0490 
(-0.63) 
EARNQUAL -0.0011 
(-2.84)** 
-0.0012 
(-2.99)*** 
-0.0011 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.0007 
(-1.46) 
PAYT 0.1756 
(3.53)*** 
0.1752 
(3.60)*** 
0.1742 
(3.46)*** 
0.1723 
(3.57)*** 
TOEHOLD -0.0510 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.0511 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.0499 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.0552 
(-3.23)*** 
MULTIPLE 0.0584 
(1.29) 
0.0583 
(1.28) 
0.0600 
(1.32) 
0.0449 
(1.01) 
DE 0.0486 
(2.15)** 
0.0475 
(2.08)** 
0.0466 
(2.08)** 
0.0409 
(1.88)* 
ROE 0.0518 
(1.73)* 
0.0490 
(1.61) 
0.0474 
(1.59) 
0.0439 
(1.46) 
MB -0.0162 
(-2.03)** 
-0.0158 
(-1.97)** 
-0.0156 
(-1.97)** 
-0.0134 
(-1.75)* 
TGTSIZE 0.0100 
(1.28) 
0.0107 
(1.38) 
0.0086 
(1.08) 
0.0069 
(0.86) 
ACOV 0.0540 
(1.15) 
0.0585 
(1.26) 
0.0449 
(0.93) 
0.0470 
(0.97) 
ALTZ -0.0715 
(-2.59)*** 
-0.0732 
(-2.68)*** 
-0.0711 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.0819 
(-3.02)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.0813 0.0830 0.0826 0.1115 
F-stat 2.605*** 2.643*** 2.634*** 3.277*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 5 – continued  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel B: Friendly takeovers (n=284)     
Intercept 0.8018 
(2.16)** 
0.7847 
(2.12)** 
0.7760 
(2.06)** 
0.7926 
(2.16)** 
RNASTOT -0.0671 
(-0.37) 
- - - 
RNASTOT*POST01 0.1216 
(0.54) 
- - - 
RNASAUD - 
 
-0.0129 
(-0.33) 
- - 
RNASAUD*POST01 - 0.0116 
(0.23) 
- - 
LNNAS - 
 
- 0.0049 
(0.41) 
- 
LNNAS*POST01  - -0.0049 
(-0.37) 
- 
AUDREP - - - 0.0571 
(0.82) 
AUDREP*POST01 - - - -0.0083 
(-0.08) 
POST01 -0.0321 
(-0.39) 
-0.0049 
(-0.08) 
0.0598 
(0.46) 
0.0133 
(0.14) 
QUALIFIED -0.1339 
(-1.58) 
-0.1369 
(-1.62) 
-0.1397 
(-1.61) 
-0.1364 
(-1.63) 
EARNQUAL 0.0044 
(2.53)** 
0.0044 
(2.54)** 
0.0044 
(2.54)** 
0.0045 
(2.61)*** 
PAYT 0.0813 
(1.46) 
0.0783 
(1.39) 
0.0756 
(1.36) 
0.0745 
(1.34) 
TOEHOLD -0.0679 
(-0.79) 
-0.0685 
(-0.79) 
-0.0676 
(-0.79) 
-0.0765 
(-0.88) 
MULTIPLE -0.0026 
(-0.05) 
-0.0072 
(-0.13) 
-0.0046 
(-0.08) 
-0.0087 
(-0.15) 
DE 0.0327 
(2.36)** 
0.0324 
(2.36)** 
0.0318 
(2.28)** 
0.0330 
(2.36)** 
ROE -0.0154 
(-4.77)*** 
-0.0154 
(-4.97)*** 
-0.0151 
(-4.82)*** 
-0.0153 
(-4.75)*** 
MB -0.0125 
(-2.56)** 
-0.0125 
(-2.57)** 
-0.0123 
(-2.50)** 
-0.0127 
(-2.55)** 
TGTSIZE -0.0362 
(-1.68)* 
-0.0356 
(-1.67)* 
-0.0386 
(-1.64) 
-0.0389 
(-1.81)* 
ACOV 0.1653 
(2.60)*** 
0.1661 
(2.65)*** 
0.1624 
(2.57)** 
0.1611 
(2.53)** 
ALTZ 0.0317 
(0.84) 
0.0308 
(0.81) 
0.0302 
(0.78) 
0.0307 
(0.82) 
Adjusted R2 0.0517 0.0526 0.0510 0.0536 
F-stat 2.036** 2.054** 2.021** 2.076** 
*** Significant at the 1% level                          ** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
